This paper studies the interconnectedness of banks in the syndicated loan market as a major source of systemic risk. We develop a set of novel measures to describe the "distance" (similarity) between two banks'syndicated loan portfolios and …nd that such distance explains how banks are interconnected in this market. As lead arrangers choose to work with those that have a similar focus in terms of lending expertise, there is a high propensity of bank lenders to concentrate syndicate partners rather than to diversify them. We …nd some evidence of potential bene…ts of this behavior as to lower costs of screening and monitoring, for example, higher shares of the loan taken by more connected lenders and lower loan spreads if syndicated lenders are more connected.
Introduction
In summer 2007, the global …nancial system entered a crisis that became truly systemic after Lehman Brothers' default in September 2008. Since then, academics and regulators have developed di¤erent concepts and proposals as to how to measure systemic risk, classify systemically important …nancial institutions (SIFIs), and trace the determinants of systemic risk. 1 Two important measures of systemic risk are "Systemic Expected Shortfall" (SES) developed in Acharya et al. (2010) and "CoVarR" in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) . Brunnermeier et al. (2011) analyze the determinants of systemic risk and identify noninterest income as a main source of systemic risk.
One overlooked possible factor in explaining systemic risk is the propensity of bank lenders to concentrate syndicate partners rather than to diversify them. Syndication is one particular example as to how …nancial institutions are interconnected. These networks are bene…cial to the …nancial system under normal conditions providing lenders the possibility to diversify risks and borrowers access to a larger pool of capital. During crises, however, this interconnectedness can lead to systemic risk if all banks hold similar portfolios and might turn the failure of one institution into a full-blown systemic crisis. "We have initiated new e¤orts to better measure large institutions'counterparty credit risk and interconnectedness, sensitivity to market risk, and funding and liquidity exposures. These e¤orts will help us focus not only on risks to individual …rms, but also on concentrations of risk that may arise through common exposures or sensitivity to common shocks. For example, we are now collecting additional data in a manner that will allow for the more timely and consistent measurement of individual bank and systemic exposures to syndicated corporate loans."
In this paper we study the issue by examining the organizational form of loan syndicates. 2 During the last decade, a fast growing literature has looked at various aspects of the syndicated loan market. 3 None of these papers, however, compares the portfolio holdings of syndicate lenders and studies the implications of their interconnectedness, particularly with respect to systemic risk. This is the main contribution of our paper.
We develop a set of novel measures to describe the "distance" (similarity) between two banks'syndicated loan portfolios and explore how this distance relates to interconnectedness. Banks'asset portfolios are inherently complex, which means that we cannot infer that two banks are similar to each other because they both invest in the same industry or market.
The extent and depth of their investment matters, as well as other types of investments and their relative weights. We thus focus on the similarity in lending expertise between two banks in the syndicated loan market as data pertaining to this market are fairly complete to provide us a comprehensive view of the banks' entire loan portfolios. This is essential to properly assess how distant/close the banks are along various dimensions such as industry specialization or physical market presence. Using DealScan's loan origination data, we compute banks' portfolio weights based on loan amounts they arranged in each area of specialization and measure the distance between two banks as the Euclidean distance based on these portfolios weights. 4 Such distance is a direct measure of interconnectedness: the closer two banks are, the more similar their loan portfolios are, and thus, the higher exposure they have to common shocks. 2 Loan syndicates are ideal for the purpose of our paper. A syndicate consists of: (i) one or multiple lead arrangers that are delegated to screen/monitor the borrower and administer the loan/syndicate, and (ii) participant lenders whose main role is often just funding part of the loan. Lead arrangers choose whom to invite to participate in the loan and may delegate certain tasks to the senior members of the syndicate, e.g., co-agents. Thus, loan syndicates provide rich content about the interrelationships among lenders. 3 Among others, Chowdhry and Nanda (1996) , Pichler and Wilhelm (2001) , and Tykvová (2007) theoretically analyze the rationale for syndication and …nd that syndicates are formed for reasons such as risk sharing, knowledge transfer, and regulation circumventing. Empirical papers on syndicated loans have examined syndicate structure from the perspectives of information asymmetry [e.g., Lee and Mullineaux (2004) , Jones, Lang and Nigro (2005) , and Su… (2007) ], lenders'reputation [e.g., Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) and Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli (2011)], and liquidity management [e.g., Gatev and Strahan (2009) ]. The e¤ect of information asymmetry and liquidity has also been studied in syndicated loan pricing [e.g., Gupta, Singh and Zebedee (2008) and Ivashina (2009) ] . 4 Giannetti and Yafeh (2009) also use the Euclidean distance, yet in a two-dimension space, to measure cultural di¤erences between lead arrangers and borrowers and within member banks in loan syndicates.
Using the distance measure, we …rst analyze how banks connect with each other through loan participation. More precisely, we study the e¤ect of distance on the syndicate structure. Do lead arrangers choose syndicate members that are more or less distant based on their specializations in a borrower's industry as well as a borrower's geographic location?
Choosing close syndicate members can be bene…cial for e¢ ciency reasons. A lead arranger can pro…t from other lenders' degree of specialization and delegate some of the syndicate functions to them [e.g., François and Missonier-Piera (2007) ] such that the cost of, for example, screening and monitoring the borrower can be reduced. On the downside, however, this strategy can also bring the corporate borrower and competing lenders closer together, eventually at the cost of future lending business. Whether the costs outweigh the bene…ts is ultimately an empirical question that is addressed by the …rst part of our paper. Overall, we …nd strong evidence that lead arrangers choose lenders that are closer in terms of specialization, i.e., those that are already more connected through similar loan portfolios as lead arrangers themselves. It is an important result. Even though this behavior can bene…t both syndicate lenders and borrowers under normal circumstances, it may as well create negative externalities during crises as banks become more systemic. Our distance measure is thus also an indirect measure of interconnectedness: the closer two banks are, the more likely they will be involved with each other's loan portfolio and thereafter become further interconnected.
We then examine the possible reasons for and consequences of banks' choosing close syndicate members. Syndicate lenders can be broadly classi…ed into three categories: (i) lead arrangers or co-leads if multiple lead arrangers exist, (ii) co-agents, and (iii) participants.
While participants expand the pool of funds available for providing loans to borrowers, coleads and co-agents can be chosen to take on some administrative responsibilities. We …nd that lenders that are closer, more connected with the lead arrangers are more likely to be given senior role functions in the syndicate, i.e., co-leads and co-agents. If responsibilities are indeed delegated to these lenders, they have incentives to shirk on their screening and monitoring e¤ort [e.g., Holmstrom (1982) , Diamond (1984) , and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)]. 5 In order to ensure proper incentives to screen and monitor, they need to have larger stakes in the loan. We …nd that the loan share held by a syndicate lender increases signi…cantly the closer it is to the lead arranger. These results are consistent with lead arrangers delegating responsibilities among syndicate members. The incremental e¤ect of distance between two banks on their collaboration over and above the e¤ects of prior bankborrower relationships provides another layer of understanding how banks collaborate in the corporate loan market which, to the best of our knowledge, is new to the literature. 6 Next, we ask how borrowers are a¤ected by the way banks are interconnected in the syndicated loan market. To analyze this, we measure the impact of lender distance in the syndicate on loan spread charged to the borrower. 7 We …nd that the net e¤ect of lender distance on loan pricing is that the borrower is charged a lower loan spread if the syndicate consists of lenders that are closer to one another in terms of specialization. This is consistent with the interpretation that borrowers are able to internalize part of the bene…ts from lenders'potential collaboration on screening and/or monitoring. It provides further support to the hypothesis that syndicate members close to lead arrangers can help reduce the overall loan syndication costs. We also ask whether greater interconnectedness among syndicate members, measured by lender distance, eventually reduces default rates. Interestingly, after controlling for borrower quality and creditworthiness, we do not …nd that the bene…ts of interconnectedness extend to loan default.
Lastly, we analyze the implication of concentrating syndicate lenders on systemic risk.
More speci…cally, we ask whether banks that are strongly connected with other banks as a result of this syndication process also contributed most to systemic risk during the 5 Strausz (1997) argues that delegation is positive as it has both incentive and commitment e¤ects. 6 We carefully control for prior relationships between banks as well as between borrowers and potential lenders in our regressions as lead arrangers may choose participant lenders based on their familiarity with borrowers when facing a high degree of information asymmetry [Su… (2007) ]. 7 Theoretically, the e¤ect may be ambiguous. On the one hand, a borrower might bene…t from savings in screening and monitoring costs as the lead arranger delegates tasks to syndicate members that are similar to itself. On the other hand, lenders that would initially compete for the same business might collude and charge a higher spread to extract more rents from the borrower as described in Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) .
2007-2009 …nancial crisis. Acharya et al. (2010) measure systemic risk as the amount by which a bank is undercapitalized in a systemic event in which the entire …nancial system is undercapitalized, and they call this concept the systemic expected shortfall (SES). De…ned as the amount of equity capital a bank drops below its target value conditional on the aggregate capital falling below a target value, SES can be explained by two factors: (i) the marginal expected shortfall (M ES) that measures the performance of the bank when the market experiences its worst, for example, 5% days within a speci…c time period (that is, the downside exposure of a bank to systemic shocks), and (ii) leverage (a more leveraged bank has, ceteris paribus, a larger shortfall in a systemic crisis). The banks with the largest capital shortfall are the greatest contributors to a …nancial crisis. Acharya et al. (2010) and Brownlees and Engle (2010) develop the systemic risk index SRISK% i which measures the percentage contribution of bank i to the overall shortfall risk. Here, we relate distance, which is our measure of interconnectedness, to M ES and SRISK% i . We …nd that based on M ES as of June 2007, which is before the crisis hit, a bank's interconnectedness explains a signi…cant portion of the variation in its shortfall risk. Moreover, we …nd that banks with the highest interconnectedness index as of 2007 are also the greatest contributors to the capital shortfall during the period from July 2007 to December 2008. We then explore this relationship in a multivariate setting using monthly SRISK% data over the period from January 2000 to November 2011 and …nd consistent results.
Taken together, syndication provides some bene…ts to banks and …rms. Supposedly, banks can diversify their risks through syndication under normal conditions. However, our analysis shows that the syndication process has increased interconnectedness of banks over the last two decades. In other words, at the same time as banks diversify their individual loan portfolios, overall risk is contained within this network, and the increasing interconnectedness of banks has elevated the exposure of these banks to systemic shocks. More broadly, our paper relates to the growing literature that studies networks in …-nancial markets. 8 Our paper contributes to this literature by analyzing the interconnectedness of banks in commercial lending networks.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we lay out our empirical methodology, in particular, derive our measures of distance in specialization. Data are described in Section 3 with summary statistics for both our sample of syndicated loan facilities and various distance measures. Sections 4-6 examines empirical results on how banks interconnect in loan syndication, what the implications of such interconnectedness are, and how this relates to systemic risk, respectively. We conclude in Section 7.
Empirical Methodology
In this section, we develop our key explanatory variables, distance measures, and how they are used in the empirical analyses. First, we describe how distance is measured between two banks based on lending specializations re ‡ected in their syndicated loan portfolios. Then, we explain how lender distance is measured at the syndicated loan facility level and what is the distance maintained by each lead arranger from its partners. Distance is viewed as a direct measure of interconnectedness in this section, and we will show that it is also an 8 See Allen and Babus (2008) for a survey.
indirect measure of interconnectedness later.
Distance between Two Lenders
We focus our analyses on the U.S. syndicated loan market, that is, syndicated loans extended to U.S. …rms. Five proxies of specializations are employed to measure a bank's lending expertise in this market related to borrower industry and borrower geographic location.
More speci…cally, we use the 1-digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit borrower SIC industry, the state where the borrower is located, and the 3-digit borrower zip code to examine in which area(s) each bank has heavily invested and thus possesses good knowledge. 9, 10, 11 We then compute the distance between two banks by quantifying the similarity of their loan portfolios. The detailed construction of our distance measures is as follows.
First, based on DealScan's loan origination data, we rank lead arrangers by the total loan facility amount originated in the U.S. market during each of the years from 1988 to 2010. 12 There are a total of 3,144 unique lead arranger-years. In order to make the data and computations more manageable, we limit our interest to the top 100 lead arrangers of each year who held an aggregated share of 99.7-100% of the total market. 13 As a result, the number of unique lead arranger-years is reduced to 1,708 in our study. Then, we compute portfolio weights for each of the top 100 lead arrangers in each specialization category (e.g., 2-digit borrower SIC industry). Let w i;j;t be the weight lead arranger i invests in specialization (i.e., industry or location) j in year t. Note that for all pairs of i and t, J P j=1 w i;j;t = 1, where J is the number of industries or locations the lender can be specialized 9 We also examine lenders'concentration in the 4-digit borrower SIC industry and …nd similar results. 1 0 The 3-digit zip code refers to the …rst three digits of the U.S. zip code, which designate a sectional center facility, the mail-sorting and -distribution center for an area. With the …rst digit of the zip code representing a group of U.S. states and the second and third digits together representing a region or a large city in that group, these three digits combined pinpoint a more speci…c geographic location than states. 1 1 Borrower geographic location is determined by the address of the borrowing …rm's headquarter. As …nancing decisions, especially those related to issuing large amounts of debt such as syndicated loans, are made by a …rm's …nance department typically located at its headquarter, it is reasonable to assume that banks develop relationships with their clients'headquarters instead of satellite o¢ ces at other locations. 1 2 Loan amount is split equally over all lead arrangers for loans with multiple leads. 1 3 According to Cai (2009) , banks commonly rotate their roles as lead arrangers and participant lenders in loan syndicates. Such reciprocal arrangements make it feasible to analyze the interrelationships among the top 100 lead arrangers since they are also heavily involved in loan participation.
in. For example, for the 2-digit borrower SIC industry, J can be as many as 100.
Next, we compute the distance between two banks (that are among the top 100 lead arrangers) as the Euclidean distance between them in this J-dimension space. 14 Let d m;n;t be the distance between banks m and n in year t, where m 6 = n. Then
(w m;j;t w n;j;t )
2 .
Appendix 1 provides examples on how to compute distance between two banks as speci…ed in ( Distance is de…ned such that the more similar two banks'loan portfolios are, the closer they are. With similar investments, banks are vulnerable to the same kinds of common shocks. Thus, distance is a direct measure of interconnectedness.
We examine the e¤ect of this distance between two banks, d m;n;t , on: (i) the likelihood of one bank being chosen as a syndicate member by the other, (ii) the frequency and depth of the relationships between these two banks, and (iii) the loan share held by one bank who takes a role, either as a co-lead, a co-agent, or a participant in the syndicate arranged by the other. Note that we use the distance in year t 1 to explain (i)-(iii) in year t. Empirical results on (i) and (ii) are in Section 4 and (iii) in Section 5.2.
Lender Distance in Syndicated Loans
There is substantial variation as to how distant syndicate members are across di¤erent loans
in our sample. To analyze how this a¤ects loan pricing and borrower performance, we need an overall measure for each syndicated loan facility. We compute the lender distance at the loan facility level as follows.
Suppose that there are X k pairs of lead arranger(s) and other members in syndicate k.
The lender distance for the loan is the average distance of these X k pairs of lenders in the previous year. Let D k;t be the lender distance in syndicate k that is arranged in year t.
Then
where d m x ;n x ;t 1 denotes the distance between the x th pair of lead arranger (m x ) and syndicate member (n x ) in year t 1, where m x 6 = n x .
We use the lender distance in a loan syndicate, D k;t , to de…ne whether it is a close or distant syndicate (Section 5.1). Furthermore, we use D k;t as a key explanatory variable for the interest spread charged to the borrower (Section 5.3) and loan default (Section 5.4).
Distance Maintained by Lead Arrangers
Each lead arranger may choose its own optimal level of distance from all the other lenders it works with via loan syndication. To see how such an implementation of distance relates to a bank's contribution and exposure to systemic risk, we compute the following measure of distance maintained by the lead arranger.
Suppose that lead arranger i originated Y i;t syndicated loans during year t. The distance maintained by the lead arranger in year t is the average distance for all these Y i;t loans. Let L i;t be the distance maintained by lead arranger i in year t. Then
We discuss the relation between a bank's systemic risk measures and the level of distance the bank maintains as a lead arranger during year t, L i;t , in Section 6 where L i;t serves as the interconnectedness index.
Data and Summary Statistics
In this section, we …rst brie ‡y describe our data sources. Then we provide summary statistics regarding lenders, borrowers, syndicated loan facilities, and the various distance measures we developed above.
Data Sources
To analyze how banks collaborate in loan syndication networks, we construct a dataset of syndicated loans in the U.S. market over the period of 1988 through July 2011 using four data sources: DealScan, Compustat, New Generation Research Bankruptcy database, and NYU V-Lab's Systemic Risk database. 15 
Loan Data
Provided by Thomson Reuters LPC, DealScan is the primary data source on syndicated loans with fairly complete coverage, especially in the U.S. market. We …rst use borrower and lender information between 1988 and 2010 to compute the distance measures between any two top 100 lead arrangers within each year. We obtain detailed data on a sample of 69,805 syndicated loan facilities originated by the top 100 lead arrangers (of the prior year)
for U.S. …rms between 1989 and July 2011. 16 We collect the following: (i) loan terms and conditions such as loan amount, maturity, and pricing, (ii) information on the borrower such as its sales, whether it is a private or public …rm, and whether it has an S&P or Moody's bond rating, and (iii) information on the lenders and their roles in the syndicate as well as loans shares at origination.
Our analysis is conducted on the loan facility level, and all the lending institutions are aggregated to their parent companies.
Firm Data and Chapter 11 Filings
In order to obtain richer …nancial information on individual borrowing …rms, we use Roberts
DealScan-Compustat Linking Database [Chava et al. (2008)] to match DealScan with Compustat based on …rm name, ticker, and location for borrowers that are public …rms, have a ticker, and/or have a credit rating. 17 We are able to retrieve …nancial data from Compustat for 32,654 loan facilities (47% of the sample).
Bankruptcy data are compiled by New Generation Research. This database contains all U.S. public companies that have $10 million or more in assets and have …led for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection since 1988. Companies with assets over $50 million that have had a default or an exchange o¤er at a substantial discount to face value are also included.
We consider a loan to default if the borrowing …rm appears in this bankruptcy database at a time while the loan is active, i.e., after the beginning date of the loan but before its maturity date. The bankruptcy data are matched with DealScan …rst through Compustat based on …rms'6-digit CUSIP, i.e., the issuer code, and then directly based on …rm name, location, and industry if no match is found in the …rst step. We are able to identify 2,140
incidents of default (6.4%) among 33,237 loans extended to public …rms or …rms that can be matched in Compustat.
Systemic Risk
We obtain information about the systemic risk contribution of our lenders to the …nancial 
Classi…cations of Lender Roles
We classify lenders into three categories based on their roles provided in DealScan: (i) lead arranger, (ii) co-agent, and (iii) participant lender. 18 A lender is classi…ed as a lead arranger if its "LeadArrangerCredit" …eld indicates "Yes." If no lead arranger is identi…ed using this approach, we de…ne a lender as a lead arranger if its "LenderRole" falls into the following: administrative agent, agent, arranger, bookrunner, coordinating arranger, lead arranger, lead bank, lead manager, mandated arranger, and mandated lead arranger. 19 If two or more lead arrangers are identi…ed, they are then co-leads to one another.
We identify a lender as a co-agent if it is not in a lead position and its "LenderRole" falls into the following: co-agent, co-arranger, co-lead arranger, co-lead manager, documentation agent, managing agent, senior arranger, and syndications agent. In addition, a lender is considered a co-agent if it is not a lead arranger based on the "LeadArrangerCredit" …eld but its "LenderRole" is in the list of titles for lead arrangers. 1 8 See Standard & Poor's A Guide to the Loan Market (2011) for descriptions of lender roles. 1 9 The "LeadArrangerCredit" and "LenderRole" …elds generate similar classi…cations of lead arrangers.
Lenders with neither lead nor co-agent roles are classi…ed as participant lenders. Panel B of Table 1 reports borrower characteristics. An average borrowing …rm in our sample has sales of $3.23 billion at loan closing. Sixty-…ve percent had previously borrowed from the syndicated loan market at least once, and the average number of previous syndicated loans among all the borrowers is 3 loan facilities. Among borrowers whose …rm type is known, 38% are identi…ed as private …rms, whereas 24% are public …rms without bond ratings and 38% are public …rms with bond ratings. 20 Among borrowers who have
Summary Statistics

Loan and Borrower Characteristics
Compustat data available, the average book value of total assets is $12.3 billion, the average book leverage ratio is 37%, the average earnings to assets ratio is 7%, and 55% have S&P debt ratings of which 56% have an investment-grade rating.
Panel C of Table 1 shows characteristics of syndicated loan facilities in our sample. An average syndicated loan facility has a size (loan amount) of $278 million and maturity of 49 months. The average interest spread on drawn funds is 224 basis points over LIBOR.
About one-third (31%) of the facilities are classi…ed as term loans. On average, there are 7 lenders in one syndicate, and the lead arrangers retains 32% of the loan. 21 The most common reason for borrowing is working capital or corporate purposes (62%), followed by 2 0 The …rm type indicated in DealScan is the most current status for the borrower at the end of the sample period and hence does not re ‡ect the change between public and private, nor between rated and unrated, over time. Thus, we cross-check the …rm type with Compustat data, i.e., whether a borrower can be found in Compustat at the time the loan was originated and whether a credit rating was available then. 2 1 The share retained by the lead arranger is available for only 16,529 loan facilities (24% of the sample). Thus, there may be some sample selection bias in spite of the fact that this is a widely used variable in the empirical literature on syndicated loans. acquisitions (24%), re…nancing (21%), and backup lines (7%). 22 Default occurred in 6% of the loan facilities in the sample. Table 2 reports summary statistics of the distance measures we described in section 2 across the 5 specialization categories, i.e., the 1-digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit borrower SIC industry, borrower state, and 3-digit borrower zip code . Panel A of Table 2 summarizes the distance between any two lenders that were among the top 100 lead arrangers in each year from 1988 to 2010, whereas Panel B and Panel C of Table 2 syndicated lending began to surge. There were also two small rises in lender distance during 2001-2002 and 2007-2010 . However, overall, the distance between any two randomly selected lenders declined by 16-20% during our sample period, whereas lender distance declined by 45-59% at the loan level and 35-45% at the lead arranger level. Interestingly, after some increases in lender distance during the crisis period, there was another sharp decrease in distance in the most recent year. It should be noted that given this time trend displayed in our distance measures, we carefully control for year or loan facility …xed e¤ects in all our empirical tests.
Distance Measures
Interconnectedness of Banks in Loan Markets
In this section, we show empirically that lead arrangers tend to invite to their syndicates lenders that are closer to themselves in terms of specialization. They are also more likely to give lenders more senior role functions in the syndicate, i.e., co-leads and co-agents, if these lenders have a similar specialization focus. Furthermore, the closer two lenders are in lending expertise, the more frequently they will collaborate, and the deeper the degree of collaboration will be. Thus, smaller distance infers stronger interconnectedness through more collaboration. This is over and above higher exposure to common shocks, and distance hence can be viewed as an indirect measure of interconnectedness.
We …rst examine whether banks choose close competitors, i.e. lenders with a similar focus in lending, as syndicate partners. As outlined in the Introduction, choosing a close competitor can have both negative e¤ects (e.g., increased competition for future business with the same borrower) and positive e¤ects (e.g., screening and monitoring responsibilities can be delegated to this chosen, similar lender). To understand the net e¤ect, we estimate the following regression:
M ember m;n;k;t = + 1 d m;n;t 1 + 2 RELL m;n;t 1 + 3 RELB n;k + 4 M S n;t 1 +F 0 k + m;n;k;t ,
where the dependent variable M ember m;n;k;t is an indicator variable that equals one if lead arranger m chooses lender n as a member in loan syndicate k that is originated in year t and zero otherwise. The key independent variable d m;n;t 1 measures the distance between lead arranger m and lender n in year t 1. RELL m;n;t 1 is a proxy for bank-bank relationships and measured as the number of syndicated loans lead arranger m syndicated with lender n prior to the current loan (no matter what roles the two lenders took). RELB n;k is a proxy for bank-…rm relationships and measured as the number of syndicated loans that were made to the borrower prior to loan syndicate k in which lender n participated (no matter what role it took). By including RELL m;n;t 1 and RELB n;k in the regression, we control for the e¤ects of prior relationships between the two lenders and prior relationships between the borrower and lender n on the construction of the syndicate, that is, who are invited to join the syndicate. M S n;t 1 is the market share of lender n as a lead arranger one year before the loan was issued, i.e., year t 1. We use M S n;t 1 to proxy for lender n's reputation and market size or power. F k is a vector of loan facility …xed e¤ects, which are included to rule out any facility-speci…c e¤ects, including the e¤ects from the borrower, the lead arranger, the time trend in a particular year, and any loan characteristics. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the year level. The regression size is
M k (100 1) observations, where K is the total number of syndicated loan facilities in the sample and M k is the number of lead arrangers in syndicate k. The resulting sample size is nearly 11 million pairs of lenders in unique loan facilities.
The results are reported in Panel A of Table 3 . Five types of distance measures are used in Columns (I) to (V), based on the 1-digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit borrower SIC industry, borrower state, and the 3-digit borrower zip code, respectively. In all regressions, our distance measures show negative coe¢ cients that are signi…cant at the 1% level. That is, the larger the distance in lending specialization between a lender and the lead arranger, the smaller the likelihood that the lender is chosen as a syndicate member. In other words, lead arrangers seek to collaborate with close competitors. Thus, our initial results support the view that lead arrangers structure syndicates in order to delegate some screening and monitoring to other syndicate members. We also …nd that a lender's prior relationships with either the lead arranger (RELL m;n;t 1 ) or the borrower (RELB n;k ) have signi…cantly positive in ‡uences on the likelihood of being chosen as a syndicate member. The e¤ect is especially strong for prior lender-borrower relationships, which con…rms the …ndings in Su… (2007). Interestingly, lender n's previous-year market share (M S n;t 1 ) reduces its likelihood to be included in the syndicate. This may imply a subtle balance in partner choice: banks prefer to work with close competitors who they or the borrower worked with before and who are not big enough to threaten future loan syndication business. 23 We then analyze the e¤ect of distance on the depth of collaboration so as to seek supporting evidence that lead arrangers collaborate to delegate screening and monitoring responsibilities within the syndicate. We measure the depth of collaboration using the syndicate role lenders are assigned to (typically by the lead arrangers). Based on the lender role classi…cations described in Section 3.2, we generate a discrete variable, Role m;n;k;t , that takes the value 0 if lender n is not a member of the syndicate, 1 if it is a participant, 2 if it is a co-agent, and 3 if it is a co-lead. While pure participants only contribute capital to the syndicate, more senior roles such as co-leads and co-agents often have managerial functions within the syndicate. A higher number for Role m;n;k;t can therefore be associated with a greater depth of collaboration. To test this, we estimate the following regression model:
Role m;n;k;t = + 1 d m;n;t 1 + 2 RELL m;n;t 1 + 3 RELB n;k + 4 M S n;t 1 +F 0 k + m;n;k;t .
The results are reported in Panel B of Table 3 . We …nd a signi…cantly negative relationship between distance and syndicated role depth at the 1% level. That is, the greater the distance from the lead arranger in terms of lending specialization, the smaller the like-lihood that a lender will be chosen as a senior member of the syndicate, consistent with the view that lead arrangers structure their syndicates to delegate screening and monitoring responsibilities to members with a similar focus and expertise in lending. 24 We provide more evidence as to the importance of common lending expertise in Table   4 , aggregating participation and syndicated role depth for each pair of lenders on a yearly basis. We …nd that the frequency and depth of lender relationships decreases in distance.
In other words, collaboration is more frequent and deeper among lenders that are more similar in lending specializations.
Speci…cally, Panel A of Table 4 estimates the following regression:
F req m;n;t = + 1 d m;n;t 1 + 2 F req m;n;t 1
where F req m;n;t is the number of times that lead arranger m chooses lender n in syndicates it leads in year t (no matter what role lender n took) and d m;n;t 1 measures the distance between lead arranger m and lender n in year t 1, which is our key independent variable of interest. F req m;n;t 1 is the lagged value of F req m;n;t , included in the regression to control for the relationships between lenders m and n in the previous year so that their current collaboration is not a simple continuation of their prior relationships. M S n;t 1 is lender n's previous-year market share as a lead arranger. L m is a vector of lead arranger …xed e¤ects and Y t is a vector of year …xed e¤ects. Note that prior lender-borrower relationships cannot be controlled for in this regression as banks may collaborate on lending to more than one borrower and the collaboration frequency variable is not borrower-speci…c. Regression (6) includes approximately 100 (100 1) T observations, where T is the number of years in the sample. The resulting sample size is close to 220,000 pairs of lenders over the sample period of 1989-2011. The coe¢ cients on our distance measures across all …ve specialization categories are consistently negative and signi…cant at the 1% level. That is, the closer two lenders are in terms of their lending specializations, the more frequently they work together in loan syndication. In addition, the coe¢ cients on F req m;n;t 1 and M S n;t 1 are signi…cantly positive, which indicates a positive impact from these two variables on lender collaboration. Table 4 estimates a similar regression with the dependent variable now measuring the aggregate depth of relationships between two banks:
Panel B of
Depth m;n;t = + 1 d m;n;t 1 + 2 Depth m;n;t 1 + 3 M S n;t 1 + L 0 m + Y 0 t + m;n;t , (7) where Depth m;n;t is the depth of all the relationships between lead arranger m and lender n in year t, computed as the sum of the ordinal variable, Role m;n;k;t , for all the loans originated by lead arranger m. That is, Depth m;n;t = Km;t P km=1 Role m;n;km;t , where K m;t is the number of loans originated by lead arranger m during year t. Recall that Role m;n;k;t equals 0 if lender n is not a member of the syndicate k m arranged by m, 1 if it is a participant, 2 if it is a co-agent, and 3 if it is a co-lead. We regress the depth of relationships between lead arranger m and lender n on their lagged distance as well as the previous-year relationship depth between them (Depth m;n;t 1 ) and lender n's previous-year market share as a lead arranger (M S n;t 1 ). Lead arranger and year …xed e¤ects are also included in regression (7).
All coe¢ cients on our distance measures are signi…cantly negative at the 5% level or better.
That is, the closer two lenders are with respect to their lending expertise, the deeper their collaboration in the syndicated loan market. In addition, the coe¢ cients on Depth m;n;t 1 and M S n;t 1 are again signi…cantly positive as expected.
One possible argument is that our distance e¤ect is driven by the size of large banks.
Large banks typically invest in more industries and/or locations, that is, they are more diversi…ed with regards to their loan portfolios. Consequently, on average the distance between two large banks will be smaller than the distance between two smaller banks or the distance between one large bank and one small bank. Thus, since large banks frequently work with other large banks, some of our results may simply be driven by the mechanical e¤ects of bank size rather than the true organizational form of loan syndicates. To examine this, we control for bank size by including each bank's syndicated loan market share in the regressions speci…ed above. In addition, to further show that bank size is not a concern, we exclude the top three to ten lead arrangers of each sample year from all regressions and obtain qualitatively similar results. 25 In other words, distance is an important factor when banks choose partners, regardless of the bank size.
Taken together, we …nd a propensity of bank lenders to concentrate syndicate partners rather than to diversify them. In the next section, we provide evidence as to the bene…ts of this strategy.
E¢ ciency Gains in Screening and Monitoring
Section 4 provides important insights into how banks choose partners in loan syndicates.
The question still arises as to why the organizational structure matters. To address this question, we examine in this section what di¤erent strategies mean to borrowers and lenders.
Close versus Distant Syndicates
A possible bene…t of inviting similar lenders in syndicates is e¢ ciency gains, for example, with respect to screening and monitoring [Strausz (1997) ]. To explore this, we …rst use the lender distance at the loan facility level [as de…ned in Equation (2)] to group our sample of syndicated loans into close and distant syndicates. The sub-sample of close syndicates consists of syndicates in which lender distance is below the median lender distance in the originating year, whereas the sub-sample of distant syndicates consists of the remaining syndicates, i.e., those with lender distance above the median. We then look into the di¤erences between close and distant syndicates. 26 In Sections 5.2-5.4 below we examine the e¤ect of distance on syndicate structure, loan pricing, and loan default in a more formal regression framework.
Distance and Syndicate Structure
If lead arrangers choose their syndicate partners to delegate some screening and monitoring responsibilities, they must give these lenders incentives to ful…ll these tasks diligently. Such incentives arise from the shares of a loan these lenders hold. The closer a lender is to the lead arranger, the more likely it will be delegated responsibilities to, then the stronger the need for incentives through a higher share of the loan. Thus, we expect that the distance in specialization between a lead arranger and a syndicate lender is negatively related to the share of the loan this lender holds. Consequently, we test the following empirical speci…cation:
Share m;n;k;t = + 1 d m;n;t 1 + 2 RELL m;n;t 1 + 3 RELB n;k + 4 M S n;t 1 +F 0 k + m;n;k;t ,
where Share m;n;k;t is the share of loan syndicate k held by lender n, and d m;n;t 1 measures the distance between lead arranger m and lender n in year t 1. RELL m;n;t 1 , RELB n;k , M S n;t 1 , and F k are the same as de…ned in Equations (4) and (5) above. That is, we regress loan share taken by lender n in syndicate k on its lagged distance from lead arranger m as well as control variables such as lender n's prior relationships with lead arranger m and the borrower, lender n's previous-year market share as a lead arranger itself, and loan facility …xed e¤ects. This regression includes close to 160,000 pairs of syndicate lenders on unique loan facilities. Note that the e¤ect of distance on Share m;n;k;t in Equation (8) is estimated conditional on the fact that lender n is a member lender of the syndicate, i.e., was chosen by the lead arranger. Based on our results in Section 4, this group of lenders are relatively closer to the lead arranger compared to those who were not selected at all. Thus, variation in distance among this particular group is smaller compared to the whole sample. Table 6 shows results for our distance measures across …ve specialization categories.
Having controlled for prior relationships (i.e., RELL m;n;t 1 and RELB n;k ,) and lender size/reputation (i.e., M S n;t 1 ), we …nd that the coe¢ cients on our distance measures are consistently negative and signi…cant at the 1% level. These results are consistent with syndicate lenders holding signi…cantly larger loan shares if they have similar lending specializations as the lead arranger, i.e., distance is smaller. We also …nd that a lender's loan share more signi…cantly increases with its prior relationship with the borrower than with the lead arranger. In addition, a lender's market share has a signi…cantly positive impact on its loan share, which may be related to larger players in the market having more funds to invest.
Distance and Loan Pricing
There exist potentially two possible e¤ects of pricing from lender distance. First, borrowers might bene…t from smaller lender distance because lead arrangers can pass on some savings from screening and monitoring costs to borrowers. However, collaboration among close competitors might also lead to extraction of rents (higher spreads) from borrowers. Our bivariate tests show that close loan syndicates are associated with lower spreads, suggesting that borrowers can internalize some of the e¢ ciency gains. To examine the net e¤ect of distance on loan pricing more formally, we run the following regression:
where Spread k;l;s;t is the interest spread over LIBOR on drawn funds. As de…ned in Equation (2), D k;t is the lender distance in syndicated loan k issued to borrower l. L l;t is a vector of borrower control variables as of year t, including whether borrower l is a private …rm, whether it has a publicly available rating, whether it has an S&P investment-grade rating, the number of syndicated loan previously borrowed, and sales at closing. M k is a vector of loan control variables, including loan amount, maturity, whether it is a term loan, loan purpose, and interest rate type (i.e., …xed vs. ‡oating). I s is a vector of borrower two-digit SIC industry …xed e¤ects and Y t is a vector of year …xed e¤ects. The unit of observation is a loan facility.
The results are reported in Table 7 . Our distance measures are all positive and signi…cant at the 1% level except distance based on borrower state. Thus, on a net basis, borrowers actually bene…t from working with close loan syndicates by paying lower loan spreads. The saving is 7-13 basis points for a reduction of one standard deviation in lender distance based on borrower industry and zip code. This result is consistent with lenders sharing some bene…ts from low lender distance with their borrowers. In addition, coe¢ -cients on the other control variables show that (i) loan spreads decrease in loan amount and increase in maturity, (ii) loans are cheaper for borrowers with S&P investment-grade ratings as well as higher sales, and (iii) term loans pay higher spreads of about 71 basis points on average.
Taken together, these results are consistent with the view that close syndicate members can help with screening and monitoring so as to reduce the overall loan syndication costs.
Distance and Loan Default
We next examine whether potential e¢ ciency gains from constructing close syndicates extend to lower default rates. We estimate the following regression:
where Def ault k;l;s;t is an indicator variable that equals one if the loan is in default and zero otherwise. L l;t , M k , I s and Y t are the same control variables and …xed e¤ects as in the regression of loan interest spread [i.e., Equation (9)]. That is, we regress loan default on lender distance, loan and borrower characteristics, and industry and year …xed e¤ects. Since the independent variables include whether the borrower is rated, whether its rating is of an investment grade, and its sales at loan closing, we control for ex-ante borrower quality and creditworthiness and hence the coe¢ cient on lender distance indicates the e¤ect of distance on subsequent loan default. The regression is estimated at the loan facility level. Table 8 reports the regression results from a linear probability model. We …nd no evidence that closer distance reduces loan default rates. 27 
Interconnectedness and Systemic Risk
The previous sections demonstrate that the syndication process has made the loan portfolios of banks increasingly similar over the last two decades. In other words, it increased the interconnectedness of banks that were active in the loan syndicate network. While there are bene…ts to syndication (some of which we have analyzed earlier in this paper), it also creates systemic risk because problems of some banks can spread throughout this network for di¤erent reasons: banks are exposed to each other, exposed to similar assets, and exposed to the same type of investors who eventually run on some banks because of problems that surfaced at other banks (and the inherent opaqueness of the banking sector).
In our empirical analysis, we follow the de…nition of systemic risk as outlined in Acharya is then
The …rm experiences a capital shortfall only if CS i;1 > 0, i.e.
where SRISK% is the percentage version. M ES is measured dynamically using asymmetric GARCH models and DCC.
NYU's Volatility Laboratory (V-Lab) Global Systemic Risk Database ("SRISK") provides systemic risk measures for about 1,200 publicly traded …nancial institutions worldwide.
We can match 53 of our top 100 lead arrangers to SRISK. Appendix 3 shows a list of these institutions. Interestingly, 24 of these institutions are also part of the FSB's list of GlobalSIFIs which more stresses the interconnectedness of the global …nancial institutions even in the U.S. syndicated loan market. 28 We start analyzing the impact of interconnectedness on systemic risk graphically using the top lead arrangers as of June 2007. Forty international institutions were responsible for 96% of the syndicated loan origination as of that date. Twenty-two of them were U.S.
…rms, among which were Wachovia, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Sterns. All three belonged to the top 15 originators that year.
We analyze whether the distance maintained by a bank [as de…ned in Equation (3)] can predict its contribution to the capital shortfall of the …nancial sector during a systemic crisis.
We collect monthly SRISK% i measures from SRISK and calculate an average relative shortfall measure for each bank during the period from July 2007 to December 2008. We plot this measure against our distance measure in Figure 2 , of which Part A shows U.S.
…nancial institutions, Part B shows European institutions, and Part C includes the full sample. We …nd that distance explains a major part of the variation of SRISK% i (R 2 is above 50%). As distance is our measure of interconnectedness, this is equivalent to say that the most interconnected banks are also the greatest contributors to systemic risk.
In a next step, we test this interconnectedness-systemic risk relation in a multivariate setting using monthly SRISK% data for the period from January 2000 to November 2011.
As not all …rms survived the …nancial crisis or had publicly traded equity throughout this time period, the panel is unbalanced with 4,998 bank-month observations. Our dependent variable is Ln [SRISK%] which is the natural logarithm of SRISK% to account for the skewness of the variable. SRISK% is left censored at 0 and our sample has 1,506
left-censored observations. That is, Ln [SRISK%] is available for 3,492 bank-month observations. 29 We construct an indicator variable European which equals 1 if the institution is headquartered in Europe. To account for di¤erences between Europe and the U.S. we introduce the interaction term Distance European. We also include as control variables (i) the natural logarithm of the quasi-market leverage ratio which is calculated as book total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity, scaled by market value of equity, and (ii) the natural logarithm of market value of equity. Both leverage and market value of equity come from SRISK. All regressions further include year-quarter …xed e¤ects.
We assess the e¤ect of Distance on Ln [SRISK%] using OLS regressions. The results are reported in Table 9 .
Model (I) of Table 9 shows that more interconnected lenders contribute more to systemic risk. The e¤ect is signi…cant at the 1% level and the R 2 is 15.94%. In Models (II)
and (III), we introduce European and Distance European. European …nancial institutions have a higher systemic risk index. We control for leverage in Model (IV). As we are interested in the change in the contribution to systemic risk of one bank relative to the other banks if interconnectedness changes, we estimate a between e¤ects model. The results are reported in Model (V) of Taken together, we …nd strong supporting evidence to our conjecture that the most interconnected banks are also the greatest contributor to systemic risk.
Conclusion
This paper studies interconnectedness of banks in the syndicated loan market as a major source of systemic risk. We develop a set of novel measures to describe how banks are interconnected based on the similarity of their loan portfolios. We use a dataset of newly originated syndicated loans for the period from 1988 to July 2011 and analyze which banks are invited to join the syndicates and how this is in ‡uenced by their existing loan portfolios.
We …nd a propensity of banks to concentrate syndicate lenders rather than to diversify them.
We analyze potential bene…ts of this behavior and …nd evidence consistent with the view that close syndicate members can help with screening and monitoring so as to reduce the overall loan syndication costs. More speci…cally, we …nd that lead arrangers assign more responsibilities to banks they are already connected with and have these banks take on higher shares of the loan as incentive. We also …nd signi…cantly lower loan spreads for closer syndicates, which suggest that cost savings exist and borrowers can internalize a fraction of these savings.
Subsequently and more importantly, we analyze potential negative externalities associated with syndication. Using data for the most systemically important lenders in this market, we …nd that interconnectedness of banks can explain the downside exposure of these banks to systemic shocks. Moreover, we …nd that the most interconnected banks are also the greatest contributors to systemic risk.
Appendix 1: Examples of Computing Distance between Lead Arrangers
This appendix shows how distance is computed by examples. Distance between two lenders is measured by their Euclidean distance as they are positioned in the Euclidean space based on their specializations in the U.S. syndicated loan market. Lender specialization in this appendix is based on 1-digit borrower SIC industry. We show below the computation of such distance among JPMorgan Chase ( 
Agriculture (0) 
Agriculture (0) This …gure shows the time series of various distance measures (by year). Distance between two lenders is measured by their Euclidean distance as they are positioned in the Euclidean space based on their specializations in the U.S. syndicated loan market. Lender specializations are measured in 1-digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit borrower SIC industry, borrower state, and 3-digit borrower zip code. Part A plots the mean distance between any two lenders that were among the top 100 lead arrangers of each year from 1988 to 2010. Part B shows the mean lender distance at the syndicated loan facility level, which is the average distance between the lead arranger(s) and all the other syndicate members in the previous year, from 1989 to July 2011. Part C shows the mean distance maintained by the lender, which is the average distance on the loan facility level for all the loans arranged by the lender during the year, from 1989 to July 2011. This table reports summary statistics of various distance measures. Distance between two lenders is measured by their Euclidean distance as they are positioned in the Euclidean space based on their specializations in the U.S. syndicated loan market. Rows (I)-(V) compute distance in terms of lender specializations in 1-digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit borrower SIC industry, borrower state, and 3-digit borrower zip code, respectively, in all panels. Panel A summarizes distance between any two lenders that were among the top 100 lead arrangers of each year between 1988 and 2010. Panel B shows lender distance at the syndicated loan facility level, which is the average distance between the lead arranger(s) and all the other syndicate members in the previous year. Panel C shows distance maintained by the lender, which is the average distance on the loan facility level for all the loans arranged by the lender during the year. This table reports coe¢ cient estimates from regressions relating the likelihood of a potential lender (that was among the top 100 lead arrangers in the previous year) being chosen as a syndicate member by the lead arranger (that was also among the top 100 lead arrangers in the previous year) to the distance between the potential lender and the lead arranger. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether the potential lender is indeed a syndicate member (0 if no and 1 if yes) in Panel A and an ordinal variable for the role of the potential lender in the syndicate (0 if non-member, 1 if participant, 2 if co-agent, and 3 if co-lead) in Panel B. The independent variable of interest is the distance between the potential lender and the lead arranger in the previous year. Columns (I)-(V) use distance as an independent variable based on lender specializations in 1-digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit borrower SIC industry, borrower state, and 3-digit borrower zip code, respectively. All regressions include loan facility …xed e¤ects. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering by year are in parentheses. * indicates that the estimated coe¢ cient is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
A. Distance between Two Lenders
A. Syndicate Member Indicator This table reports coe¢ cient estimates from regressions relating the frequency and depth of relationships between two lenders (that were among the top 100 lead arrangers in the previous year) to the distance between them. The dependent variable is the frequency of being members in the same syndicate during one year in Panel A and the depth of all these relationships (computed as the sum of an ordinal variable indicating 0 if non-member, 1 if participant, 2 if co-agent, and 3 if co-lead over all syndicated loans originated during the year) in Panel B. The independent variable of interest is the distance between the two lead arrangers in the previous year. Columns (I)-(V) use distance as an independent variable based on lender specializations in 1-digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit borrower SIC industry, borrower state, and 3-digit borrower zip code, respectively. All regressions include year and lead arranger …xed e¤ects. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering by year are in parentheses. * indicates that the estimated coe¢ cient is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
A. Frequency of Relationships between Lenders This table reports the mean di¤erences between close and distant syndicates on various borrower and loan characteristics, that is, the mean of close syndicates minus the mean of distant syndicates ( CloseDistant ). The sample of 69,805 syndicated loan facilities is split into two sub-samples based on the yearly median of the lender distance at the loan level. The sub-sample of close syndicates consists of syndicates in which lender distance is below the median of the originating year, whereas the sub-sample of distant syndicates consists of the remaining syndicates. Lender distance at the syndicated loan facility level is de…ned as the average distance between the lead arranger(s) and all the other syndicate members in the previous year. Columns (I)-(V) use distance based on lender specializations in 1-digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit borrower SIC industry, borrower state, and 3-digit borrower zip code, respectively. * indicates that the mean di¤erence is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. This table reports coe¢ cient estimates from regressions relating the loan share taken by a lender in the syndicate to the distance between the lender and the lead arranger. The dependent variable is the share of the loan taken by the lender in percentage. The independent variable of interest is the distance between the lender and the lead arranger in the previous year. Columns (I)-(V) use distance as an independent variable based on lender specializations in 1-digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit borrower SIC industry, borrower state, and 3-digit borrower zip code, respectively. All regressions include loan facility …xed e¤ects. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering by year are in parentheses. * indicates that the estimated coe¢ cient is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) This table reports coe¢ cient estimates from regressions relating loan pricing to the lender distance at the syndicated loan facility level. The dependent variable is the interest spread over LIBOR on drawn funds measured in basis points in all panels. The independent variable of interest is the lender distance of the loan, which is the average distance between the lead arranger(s) and all the other syndicate members in the previous year. Columns (I)-(V) use distance as an independent variable based on lender specializations in 1-digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit borrower SIC industry, borrower state, and 3-digit borrower zip code, respectively. All regressions include year, loan purpose, interest rate type, and borrower 2-digit SIC industry …xed e¤ects. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering by borrower 2-digit SIC industry are in parentheses. * indicates that the estimated coe¢ cient is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) Term loan indicator 71.144 (3.6660) 71.252 (3.6823) 71.203 (3.6893) 71.553 (3.6511) 71.362 (3. This table reports coe¢ cient estimates from regressions relating loan default to the lender distance at the syndicated loan facility level. The dependent variable is the loan default indicator (0 if no default and 1 if default). The independent variable of interest is the lender distance of the loan, which is the average distance between the lead arranger(s) and all the other syndicate members in the previous year. Columns (I)-(V) use distance as an independent variable based on lender specializations in 1-digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit borrower SIC industry, borrower state, and 3-digit borrower zip code, respectively. All regressions include year, loan purpose, interest rate type, and borrower 2-digit SIC industry …xed e¤ects. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering by borrower 2-digit SIC industry are in parentheses. * indicates that the estimated coe¢ cient is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. This table reports coe¢ cient estimates from regressions relating a bank's contribution to the systemic risk of the …nancial system (SRISK% ) to its interconnectedness in the syndicated loan market (distance). The dependent variable, Ln [SRISK%] , is the natural logarithm of SRISK%. The independent variable of interest is the distance maintained by a lead arranger, which is the average distance on the loan facility level for all the loans it arranged during the year. Distance used in this table is based on 1-digit borrower SIC industry. European is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank is headquartered in Europe. Distance European is the interaction term of Distance and European. Ln [leverage] is the natural logarithm of the quasi-market leverage ratio calculated as (book assets -book value of equity + market value of equity) as a percentage of market value of equity. Ln [market value] is the natural logarithm of market value of equity. All regressions include year-quarter …xed e¤ects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates that the estimated coe¢ cient is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
